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'lHE fDnR FASf ASIAN EIllDflC REVIE.W

Volune 9, NtDJber 2, August 1988

ASPECTS OF COUNTERTRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT
William J. Rieber
University of Wisconsin

I. Introduction
Countertrade or international bu-ter bas enjoyed
a flourish of activity during the 19808.
Bare
authors have ~ed that countertrade is an
effective developnent tool for third world countries
and indeed represents the beginning of a rearrangement of the international econanic order in favour
of lesser developed. countries.
Griffin and Rouse
(1986, p.178) .state , "that counter-trade is a development strategy currently being adopted by leading
third world countries that may achieve the long
sought restructuring of the globll econanic order".
And they assert (p.196) : ''Many countries (including
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,
China, Australia and Canada) insist upon countertrade in spite of solid foreign reserve holdings.
For these industrializing nations, linking trade
flows is a major tool by which diversification
of trading p:u-tners and exertion of national sovereignty over DIllti-nationals can be achieved." '!be
Far Eastern Econanic Review in its cover story
on January 27, 1983 states (p.49) : "By canpelling
these industrialized countries to accept p:u-t plyment
in ccmoodities the primary producers are circtmventing
the international pricing mechanisn and achieving
what decades of negotiations on international caurodi ty agrearents and cartels bas failed to achieve".
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. On the other band, others have suggested that
countertrade is an aberration refleCting a misguided
understanding of international trade and finance
by roc policynakers.
For example, Bmks (1983,
p.179) states : "Any attraction which countertrade
(and other forms of barter) DRY have for developing
countries is largely based on a misapprehension
concerning its ability to arreliorate their difficult
trade and pl.ynEnts situation in the context of
a world recession.
In practice, countertrade will
a.lIoost certainly rmke DRtters worse."
The thesis of the present pl.per is that neither
of these two views is generally correct.
That
is, the popularity of countertrade does not signal
the beginning of a new international econanic order
by shifting terms of trade in favour of developing
countries nor does it represent ignorance by roc
policyrmkers.
Rather it Sea:ns that countertrade
is nvre a natural outgrowth of the econanic environment of the 1980s : the presence of state trading
agencies in countries with lRlance of pl.ynEnts
deficits, combined with exchange rate volatility
and declining nvney growth.
The outline of the pl.per is as follows.
In
Section II the various types of countertrade are
defined and examples given.
Section III first
criticizes the claim that countertrade enables
developing countries to improve their trading terms.
The experiences of OPEL and ASFAN are contrasted
to illustrate that the colIDtries roost active in
countertrade are generally those that sell countertraded goods below world IIRrket price levels.
Section II also examines why countries with lRlance
of pl.yments deficits are riDre prone to engage in
countertrade if their external trade is conducted
largely by state trading agencies.
Section IV
considers how exchange rate volatility and declining
nvney growth also have contributed to the surge
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in countertrade.
The literature on this aspect
of countertrade bas generally focused directly
on IOOdern econcmies.
But in the present piper
the efficiency of barter in primitive economies
is first examined.
'Ibis analysis of primitive
econcmies gives further wulerstanding why econcmic
agents in IOOdern economies, especially state trading
insti tutions, lIB.y embrace countertrade given uncertain
exchange rates and liquidity shortages.
Section
V briefly discusses the future prospects of countertrade.
II. Types of Countertrade
Countertrade can take IIBIlY forms and is estillRted
to account for anywhere from 5 percent to ·30 percent
of world tradif.
The range is wide because governments do not routinely record countertrade transactions in their balance of payments.
First,
there is simple barter.
The recent agreaoont by
the Philippine Boord of Investments and the Indonesian
goverrment to exchange phosphoric acid fran the
Philippines for amoonia from Indonesia is an instance
of this type of countertrade.
An offset
(also called plI'allel blrter or
counterpurcbase) occurs when a business finn IlD.lSt
purchase goods often unrelated to its business
operations as pirt of an international deal.
The
actual counterpurcbase IIB.Y take place over a nul tiyear period.
For example, when International CanIOOdities Export Corporation recently exported fertilizer to Indonesia to fulfill a government contract,
it purchased Indonesian products including cocoo.,
coffee and rubber.
A buyl:ack (also called import canpens1tion)
resul ts when piyment to a foreign firm or foreign
governoont for their capital equiprent or technical
assistance in constructing a new factory in the
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local econany is IIBde with output derived fran
the equipmnt or factory.
O:rina bas relied on
technology am equipmnt supplied by U. S. and Japmese
finns to develop its oil and cooJ. resources.
Oil
and cooJ. derived over the years fran these investrrent
projects are often used as payment to the U.S.
am Japmese fi:rms.
Finally, bilateral clearing occurs when governrrents of two countries attanpt to 1Blance their
bilateral trade, and therefore conserve on the
use of foreign exchange.
For example, India's
import bill for Soviet oil declined in the 1980s
as the rm.rket price of oil fe:J.l, which led to a
trade surplus for India with the Soviet Union.
'!be Soviet Union then asked India to purchase IOOre
of its goods in order to 1:Rlance their trade.
III. Countertrade '!be Tenns of Trade and Payments. Deficits
I

Tenns of Trade
Countertrade

is

said

to

allow

roc

policyrmkers

byplss the international pricing systan am
assist I1X!s in their developmnt plans by improving

to

their tenns of trade. 2
Yet this view certainly
misconstrues the pricing process.
In . a lBrter
transaction, as in a roonetary one, it is the relative
price that IIB.tters.
Supply and damnd forces are
just as important with t:ii.'rtei" as with IOOnet;ary
exchange.
'!bere are IltJ:OOrous examples where prices
were adjusted in countertrade proposals when there
were changing rm.rket conditions.
Thailand in 1981
tenninated an ag:reaoont to mrter its IIBize for
Ramni an fertilizer when high world IlBize prices
IIBde the deal uneconanic.3 Oil countertrade proposals
are often altered to reflect changing world prices
of oil.
Such a pricing adjustmmt occurred in
a mrter of planes fran the United Kingdan for
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Saudi Arabian Oil 4 when oil prices fell sharply
during winter 1986.
Indeed one gets a clearer
picture of why sane countries are or not avid countertraders by considering their policies in relation
to world rmrkets for their caooodities.
OPEC.
Consider first <JlJEC.
Many of these
nations are saddled with large foreign debts at
the sarre t:iroo that cartel production quotas limi.t
their exports of oil.
'!bese nations are inclined
to bide price discounts on oil through countertrade
to increase exports.
Hence CJ.PEC nations have been
active countertraders since they have been willing
to accept prices below existing world levels.
'!be Saudi Arabian goverIlOOnt bas lamented that
countertrade leads to lower oil prices
despite
having JB,rticiIRted itself in such deals. 5
Im1ks
(1985, p.257) reports that in 1984 as nruch as 20
percent of exports of OPEC was countertraded.
Indeed it bas been said that "Oil is the currency
of countertrade."
Recent reports suggest that oil countertrading
and price discounting ram.in strong. 6
Libya bas
offered to supply all of Uganda I s oil imports in
exchange for coffee, DRize and beans.
Libya bas
evidently given a special price to Uganda to undercut
other oil exporters.
Also, Libya has traded oil
for capital goods,
including a water treatment
facility, an airforce air shelter and a housing
canplex.
Besides trading oil for canoodities,
Iraq
bas offered to IRY off foreign debts in oil and
Iran bas exchanged oil for ceoont rmnufacturing
caIRCity in a deal with a Turkish finn.
Nigeria
has indicated it is now preIRred to countertrade.
Oil caIRCity in Nigeria is about 2 million 1Brrels
a day but its daily OPEC quota is 1.6 rrdllion barrels.
Although Nigerta officially states it will countertrade wi thin the quota, it is reported that the
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COWltertraded oil will likely caoo fran the unused
capiCity .
Even non-<JP.Er! oil producers countertrade oil.
Mexico bas offered to hlrter oil at
a discount to Nicaragua for agricultural goods
and raw lIRterials.
ABEAN.
It is useful to contrast the experience
of ()PE[! with that of certain 7 ABEAN countries
'lbailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.
These countries
specify that the prices of their countertraded
goods should reflect world prices and countertrade
deals should represent an addition to already existing
trade.
'Ibis helps explain why they have generally
been less active in countertrade than OWly OPEC
nations that readily countertrade oil at discount
prices.
'Ibailand set guidelines in 1981 to gOvern
its COWltertrading.
Speci:(ically, 'Ibailand wished
to increase exports of six ~cultural products:
rm.ize, cotton, rice, rubber, sugar and tapioca.
Thailand has found few opportunities to buter
its agricultural products, as they have been relatively strict to require world prices for their
bartered goods and that buter trade not substitute
for existing trade.
It is estiDRted that countertrading activity through early 1986 was only approx:iJm.tely U.S. $ 175 million, with three of the
I

four

rmjor

deals

being

rmde

wjth

&wiet

moe.

countries. 8
The Iohlaysian goverrmmt introduced countertrade policies in 1983 and accepts countertrade
proposals fran foreign suppliers bidding on goverment
contracts.
These policies attaopt to shift exports
away fran traditional raw lIRterials to higher value
added goods; e. g. , logs, tin and crude JRlm oil
are excluded fran countertrade.
Malaysia requires
that its countertraded exports be 'sold either a)
to the COWltry that supplies the imports fulfilling
the goveI"IUEnt contract or b) to designated third
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countries.
In this way the goverorent seeks to
insure that cotmtertrade does not rrerely replace
cash trade.
'lbrougb. Ma.rcl:1 1985 cotmtertrade totalled
about M $330 million (U. S. $132 million) ~
Of the three COWltries,
Indonesia bas been
the lOOSt active in countertrading since introducing
policies in 1981 to praoote non-oil and gas exports
IDclUdiI1g PlYWOOd,
rtlbber,
tiiDlJer,
cocoo. beBilS
and textiles.
The governrent requires foreign
finns winning oajor goverorent contracts to purchase
Indonesian goods equivalent in value to oaterials
imported for the goverorent project.
Indonesia
though bas not closely IOOnitored whether countertraded goods satisfy its additionality req~nt
and represent new trade.
Foreign suppliers taki ng
countertraded goods are pennitted to assign these
goods to traders who sell than in the best available
oarkets.
It is difficult to know in exactly what
countries these goods eventually end-up and therefore
whether countertrade displaced SCIre cash trade.
This assignoont rule along with the vigour in which
Indonesia praooted COWltertrade ,
given declining
oil and gas revenues, led to approxiImtely U.S.
$1.5 billion in cotmtertrade contracts through
1986.
But recently activity bas declined.
It
is estioated that a total of about U.s. $200 million
worth of deals were rm.de in the two years 1~
and 1987 caopu-ed with U. S. $400 million in 1985.
The goveI"IlOOnts of two other ASFAN cotmtries,
the Philippines and Singapore, have not been actively
involved in COWltertrade.
Philippine countertrade
bas been kept to a rnjnimlD due in put to International Monetary Fund restrictions, and Singapore
bas a free trade policy.
However, Singapore in
1986 and 1987 granted pioneer tax exanption status
for five years with possibility of extension to
nine trading ccmpmi es, including Qu-gill trading
of the U. S., to establish subsidiaries in Singapore
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enf?iJgi ng in countertrade.
Singapore is already
a center of entrepot activity in Southeast Asia
and is intent in canpeting IOOre effectively with
Hong Kong for countertrade business .
Countertrade then surely cannot be an effective
neans of bYJDSSing the existing v.urld pricing structure, except that it nay pennit countries (e.g.,
CJI>OC) to price discr:iminate IOOre easily since countertrade deals are IOOre' canplicated and less t:ra.nsp1.rent
than overt DDIletary agreanents.
The international
pricing system (i.e., world supply and demand)
is not being circunvented; rather oarkets are being
segregated with nations initiating m.rter often
accepting lower prices on m.rtered goods.
On these
exports the nation incurs a tenns of trade deterioration, although the country's (and the world I s)
real incam DRy increase since the price of these
exports still exceeds oarg'inal cost. 11

Ihl ance of PaYIOOnts fufici ts
Another reason generally given for the attractiveness
of countertrade in the 1980s is the l:Blance of
JRytOOIlts deficits experienced. by oany countries. 12
Yet 00lance of JRYIOOnts deficits are not a unique
feature of the 1980s.
fuficits (and surpluses)
'Were DIlch IOOre a pu:t of the Bretton Woods Systan
(1944-1971) where exchange rates ~ fixed, although
adjustable.
International m.rter did not flourish
during this period or in the 1970s for that DRtter. 13
In fact,
countries today have additional tools
to address JRYIOOnts deficits not available to policyDBkers during Bretton Woods : they can alter their
excl1ange rates, gradually or drastically, without
prior approval by the International Monetary Fund
or even allow their currencies to floo.t.
It is a special cbaracteristic of countries
experiencing deficits in the 1980s that DBkes buter
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appealing.
J.tmy of these countries, often I1X!s,
conduct much of their international trade through
state agencies.14
State trading agencies naturaliy
take into account the country IS lBlance of IRyroonts
in its trade behaviour.
To the extent that lBrter
can provide a closer natching of exports and imports,
pennit price discrimination or "hide" foreign exchange
fran creditor bulks, b1.rter will be a useful tool
for these agenC1es.
If a deficit country relies on private domestic
f:inn.s to conduct the nation I s international trade,
then no large-scale resort to blrter will likely
occur .15
Private finns are interested in their
own talance sheets and incaoo statarents and not
the country's 00lance of IRyroonts.
lD.rtering the
finn I s products for say fertilizer will generally
not be initiated by the finn since its employees
and shareholders do not wish to be IBid in fertilizer.
GoverIlOOnt agencies, on the other band, do
not IRrticipl.te in international trade for profit.
Nor do guverrrrent employees get IBid directly fran
the receipts of foreign sales.
Bather the imports
received fran blrtering exports nay be destined
for use or CODSlIDption anywhere in the econcmy
where say fertilizer is in damnd. lIence, state
trading agencies will DDre likely anbrace lBrter
than private f:inn.s since econany-wide imports and
exports can be better lBlanced and because imported
goods can be directed to various IRrts of the country
through state distribution facilities.
IV. Money, Barter and EXchange Bates
Pr:imitive :&onanies
A caIIOOD. perception shrowding countertrade nay
be, ''rooney was invented to replace blrter, not
the other way around."
It nay seen that any resort
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to blrter, daoostic or international, narks a reversion to an antiquated IOOthod of conducting transactions.
Yet it cannot be DBintained that 1:nrter
was ever the priImry means of trade, even in the
IOOre primitive econanies. 'lbat is, it is a misperception to suggest that a DEditIO of exchange was introduced to replace 1:nrter for all tiIOO by enlightened
individuals who eventually (or all of a sudden)
realized the greater efficiency associated with
IOOnetary exchange.
IIrleed Hunpbrey (1985, pA8)
asserts
''No example of a 1:B.rter ecoricmy, pure
and simple, bas ever been described, let alone
the anergence fran it of lOOney ; all available
ethnography suggests that there bas never been
such a thing."
au-ter and a DEditIO of exchange
have existed side by side and rmrket puticipmts
bad a choice as to which fonn of exchange they
found IOOre attractive~6
in lIBIly cases the DEditIO
of exchange was "primitive" Or "cauoodity" lOOney
such as· rice, wbales teeth, shells, cattle, rm.ize
or salt instead of currency and checking deposits.
Nevertheless, imividuals often found 1:nrter IOOre
convenient and econanical than the use of IIDDey,
be it caooodity , fiat, or lm1k lOOIley.
There nay be several reasons for this preference
for 1:nrter.
A 1:nrter trade can accanplish in one
transactj on what rmy take (at J fflFj1:) two transactWns
with a DEdiun of exchange .. For i.nstance, a fishenm.n
can 1:nrter fish directly for the furs of a hunter.
With a meditlO of exchange, the fishermm first
sells fish for lOOIley and in turn exchanges DDlley
for furs.
Of course, a double coincidence of wants
IWSt be lOOt before the single 1:nrter transaction
daninates the use of lOOI1ey. Yet as Einzig (1986,
p. 343) points out
"the' double coincidence I (
to quote the word of Jevons) that must arise is
by no IIBlllS difficult to achieve in a smll c.cmmmity
where everybody knows a great deal about everybody
else I s products and :requirEments.
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OJanges in lOOney supply IIRY affect the preference
for lRrter versus IIDnetary trade.
Einzig (1966,
p.417) states :
"As a rule the relative extent of IIDnetary

natural econanies is liable to
changes,
and
changes in the volune
or value of lOOney are liable to· affect
it.
A IOOderate rise in prices through
an expmsion in the volune of IIDney
tends to increase the proportion of
lIDuetary econany to natural econany ,
because an increased Illmber of people
are taopted by higher prices to sell
against IIDney rather than lRrter their
goods or services.
Conversely a decline
in prices due to IIDnetary causes leads
towards an increase in the relative
importance of natural econany.
This
phenarenon is noticeable als:> in primitive
COIJIIlIli ties using IOOdern UXJ[ley.
During
the depression of the thirties, the
sharp decline of prices of local products
in IIRIlY prrts of the world resul ted
in a reluctance to accept lower prices
in lOOney, and rmny people reverted
to lRrter."
and

Moreover, while IIDney nay be used for darestic
transactions, lRrter nay be chosen for foreign
trade.
For example, even into the 1930s the inhabitants of the Yap island group in the Caroline Islands
in the West Pacific avoided the use of foreign
currencies because the currencies were subject
to sharp fluctuations in their international value
and acceptabili ty .
Although lRrter and "stone"
lOOney were used for darestic trade on the Yap islands,l,.
foreign trade was generally conducted through tarterl / .
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EXchange Rates in lItxiern Fconanies
What then of countertrade in the current world
econany ? If rmrket pirticipmts have access to
a SOJirlsticated mIltilateral p:lyuents systan, then
why choose international tarter rather than enjoying
the fullest benefits of a IIEditm of exchange ?
Consider a hypothetical example of trade rurong
four countries : Iridonesia,' the Philippines, Japm
and the United States.
possible trading p:lttern
would be as follows.
The Indonesian gove:rrmmt
exports rubber to Japm with p:lyoEnt in yen.
It
then sells these yen for pesos to purchase sugar
fran the Philippines.
Over the saroo period, the
Philippine gove:rment sells sugar in the U.S.
for dollars and then exchanges dollars for rupiah
to purchases Indonesian rubber.
An alternative
schere, for Indonesia and -the Philippines at least,
would be for state ministers of both countries
to agree to lRrter rubber for sugar. State trading
agencies, by identifying a double coiJicidence of
wants, achieve their export and import preferences
with one transaction.
There are saoo canplications associated with
the m.rter transaction, as there III:l.y be serre :imlnlance
between the respective volures of .rubber and sugar
that the tvuo countries wish to trade.
Yet this
irnlRlance III:l.y be slight enough to justify avoiding
the series of monetary transactions cited above,
especially if exchange rates are not rigidly fixed.
With fluctuating exchange rates the potential adverse
change in exchange rates during the t:iIre in which
foreign currency is held adds an elerent of risk
to the IOOnetary transactions.
Another problan with IOOnetary exchange occurs
if say the Philippines wishes to import the rubber
before it actually exports the sugar. The Philippines
III:l.y be unable to obtain credit to finance the purchase
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of rubber because of a OOlance of plyroonts deficit
and a large foreign debt.
But such financing IIRy
be implicitly given to the Philippines through
a OOrter a.g:ree:IEnt when the Philippines agrees
to ship the sugar at saoo agreed-upon tiIoo after
the rubber bas been imported.
The argtlllEnts above suggest that it is nat
surprising that international 1:Brter would increase
a situation that characterizes the 198Os.
The
Bretton Woods Adjustable Peg Systan provided reasonable exchange rate stability fran 1944 to 1971
since currencies were pegged to the U. S. dollar .
The 1970s, al though no longer a period of fixed
exchange rates, witnessed rrore stability than the
1980s.
For instance, fran 1971 through 1979, the
average annual change in the effective exchange
rate of the U.S. dollar against other O.E.C.D.
currencies was 3.8 percent.
Fran 1980 through
1986 the average annual exchange rate change of
the dollar against O.E.C.D.
Currencies was 7.6
percent}..8 The dollar declined. in value by approxiIIRtely 40 percent a~inst the two other IIRjor currencies, the JaplDese yen and West Gernan nark, fran
February 1985 to March 1988.
Greater exchange
rate volatility adds risk to using foreign currency
in conducting international trade, therefore, international OOrter becares relatively roore attractive.
IIbnetary Growth in Modern Econanies
The

historical

experience

suggests

that

OOrter

grows when there is either too IIIlch lOOney and hyperinflation 19
or too little lOOney in the econany.
In the absence of perfect wage and price flexibility,

a shortage of rroney will IIEWl a contraction of
econanic activity and roore limits on the profitable
division of labor.
Fconanic agents naturally seek
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to overcar:e this shortage of DDIley by utilizing
other rreans to facilitate trade.
The worldwide
contraction in daoostic DDIley supplies and the
depression of the 1000s led developed countries
to show greater preference for m.rter.
In EUrope
especially, bilateniJ.. trade agreanents were IIDde
between govern:oonts to conserve on the use of lOOney. 20
The weighted average of tJ:re real IOOIley supply
in the 21 lmdi ng industrial countries increased
approx:iJm.tely 1.57 percent per year fran 1970 through
1979.
Fran 1980 through 1985 the real IOOD.eY supply
in these countries increased approx:i.Jm.tely
.53
percent per year.
'!be real DDOOy supply in these
countries fell by approx:i.Jm.tely 2.25 percent
year during the four year period 1979-1982.
The relative decline in the rate of growth of rooney
also helps explain the growing appeal of countertrade. 22
.

2F

v.

The Future of Countertrade
Will countertrade continue to grow in popularity
and perhaps account for as much as 50 percent of
world trade by the· year 2000, as predicted by Jaroos
Walsh of the U.S. ~pu1Ioont of Cauoorce ?23 Whether
this growth does take place will certainly depend
on the volatility of exchange rates and especially
the U.S. dollar ~te,-_BDIlC_tary_poliey in OEED eoun
tries, and the pervasiveness of state trncljng agencies
in developing econanies.
It is very difficult
to predict the course of future exchange rates
or IOOnetary growth in the OErD. But the extent
of state trading in developing countries DRY depend
in IRrt 00. the trend in DIlDy countries to privatize
activities
fOI'lOOrly
undertaken
by
goverooont.
Privatization schaoos are being implamnted or
at least being seriously considered in Indonesia,
where over 200 state finos are being considered
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sale; Malaysia, port facilities and sewage
water supply facilities may be privatized;
Rrllippines, where over 400 state finns may be
sold; Pakistan, considering privatizing lBsic industries that were originally nationalized in 1972;
Thailand, a state bmk and state zinc refinery
may be sold; Sri lanka, its state-run telecrnmmicatjoos authorjty and state=owned tea estates IIBY
be privatized; India, where a general privatization
of gegJOOnts of the public sector including the
telecmmmications and airline industries may take
place; and China, with its econcmic refoI1ILS, to
name sare examples.
The International Ib:letary
Fund, World Blnk and the U.S. Agency for International
D:welopnent have pushed privati:zation in DBllY developing countries.
If these programs achieve the
desired results of lower budget deficits and greater
production efficiencies,. then the move to privatization will continue.
In. JRrticular, goverorents
may relinquish sare of their involvaoont in international trade and the role and scope of state
trading may diminish.
Countertrade should decline
as IOOre trade is left in private bands.
Yet ~ goverIllHlts have not been as active
in privati:zation and are unlikely to reduce their
role in oil production and trading.
Moreover the
world share market crash in October 1987 may lead
to delays or indefinite postpollalEnts of sare priviti:zation plans.
Hence, it is perhaps too early to
tell whether both the overall i.nJpJct of privi ti:zation
and its JRrticular effect on state trading and
COWltertrade will be significant.
for

and
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FOOTNOTES
1.

See for example Cohen and Zysmn (1986, pp.41-42),
Miraroon (1985, p.24), Cooper (1984, p.36), Walsh
(1983, p.3), Bmks (1983, pp.162-163), Alexandrides
and Bowers (1988, p.44).

2.

See in prrticular Griffin and Rouse (1986) and
the Far Eastern Econanic Review, January 27, 1983,
pp.49-56.

3.

See ImIIWl (1986, p.18).

4.

See Beutel (1986, p.12).

5.

See Fmuooney Trade Finance Report, February 1985,
p.19.

6.

See recnet issues of Fmuooney Trade Finance Report
and Trade Finance.

7.

Indonesia is also a
not countertrade oil.

8.

See Thumm (1986, p.14).
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pA3.
10.

See Trade Finance,

Septanber 1987,

p.41.

11.

Cooper (1984) and especially Bmks (1985) provide
thorough discussions as to wby d<JlEstic and international price controls can lead to production
surpluses and a resort to countertrade.
See also
Rieber (1982) for a general equilibritm roodel
of international price discrimination.
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See for instance Walsh (1983) and Czinkota and
Talbot (1986), aroong lIBD.y others.

Parter did expwd to

SCIDe

extent during the 1970s

as East-West trade grew. The preference for lBrter
then was a result of the nonconvertiviIity of
the currencies of mmy EaSte:r ft countries.
International b:.u Ler between
e market oriented econo

om

mies did not surge until the 198Os.
For further
discussion of this point, see Cohen and Zysmn
(1986) .
14.

(1983, p.174) cites India, where perhaps
percent of imports involve state agencies.

:amks

70
15.

The importance of state involvaoont in international
trade in exp] ai oj ng the rise of countertrade is
underscored by Cohen and Zy~ (1986).

16.

See also IlUton

(1982)

for a succinct discussion

of lRrter.
17.

For a further discussion of the trading in Yap,
see Einzig (1966, pp.36-40).

18.

See

OEU>

:&x>nanic

Outlook,

42,

~r

1987,

p.l95.
19.

See llirnbusch and Fischer (1986) for an examination
of the Genmn, Austrian and Iblish hyperinflations
during the 1920s.
There is also a discussion
of the Italian hyperinflation of the 1940s and
the recent periods of high inflation in Isreal'
and Argentina.

20.

See:amks (1983, pp.177-178) for further discussion
of bilateral trade moong European countries during
the depression years.
Ellis (1945) provides the
sani na] analysis of the effects of bilate:raliBD.
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21.

InterSee International Financial Statistics
national Monetary FW1d, various issues; canputations
by the autlior.
In 1986 the real IOOlley supply
in these countries increased by 9.2 percent.
A continuation of this trend should reduce countertrade, all else equal.

22.

For related perspectives on the recent
contraction and the role of exchange
explaining the surge in countertrade,
(1983), Business International, August
pp.273-275, Cooper (1984) and Griffin
(1986).

23.

1ms prediction by James Walsh,
is reported in Cooper (1984, p.36).

an

. worldwide
rates in

see &u1ks
31,

1984,

and Rouse
econanist,
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